Together with Thomas Falck and Liv Dingsør, NORSAR's CEO has summarized some observations from four years of full-scale war in Ukraine, and what we must learn from it about defending Norway.

In hindsight, this could have gone very differently. Most people outside Ukraine expected a quick Russian takeover. On the other hand, if Ukraine had had perfect situational awareness of Putin's intentions, prepared supply lines and suppliers of ammunition and weapons, money to pay for them, and strong alliance partners who were committed and ready to assist – as we like to think we have – the attack might have been repulsed in 2022.

But that was not the case then, and much of this is still missing in 2026. Therefore, Ukraine has had to defend itself in ways that violate both written and unwritten rules of "normal" warfare. Admittedly, the international law of war is the superior opponent in terms of resources.

From a NATO perspective, however, there is much to marvel at: Soldiers of conscription age are relatively few on the Ukrainian side of the front. Everyone must be included, and the average age is closer to 50 than 40. Equipment and supplies come from a myriad of suppliers and players – NGOs from home and abroad, private individuals, in-house manufacturing and even Chinese e-commerce platforms. The distinction between civilian and military equipment, and between commercial, non-profit and military suppliers, has been abolished. The pace of innovation is unheard of. Weapon systems that could take 10 years to develop and with an expected lifespan of 20 years in NATO are developed in months, and can be outdated in a year. Cost-effectiveness is key - it is not sustainable to use a missile that costs one million for defense against a drone that costs ten thousand. In Brave1, Ukraine, largely thanks to the then Minister of Digitalization, now Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov, has Europe's most effective policy support system. Here, military units receive points for achieved results and startups a market for their products and services.

It may be natural to think that all this is only happening because Ukraine was so unfortunate in the first place, that our situation in Norway is fundamentally different, and that we should continue to prepare for a "normal" war.

That would be a big mistake. We should relate to the experiences of Ukraine's four years of defensive war with respect and curiosity. The basic principle should be that we "steal with pride", and our emergency managers, on both the military and civilian side, should be able to give good explanations where we choose not to.